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Roula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.
The writer is director of UK in a Changing Europe, a think-tank
I couldn’t help a slight sense of schadenfreude watching the French and German governments tearing strips off each other last month — following a summit intended to underline western unity over Ukraine.
Yet there could hardly have been a worse moment for this to happen. War still rages in Ukraine. The prospect of another Donald Trump presidency in America has sharpened the possibility that Europeans will have to take more responsibility for their own security.
Once their spat has subsided, Paris and Berlin will have to think about how to address these challenges. Years of free riding have left European countries hopelessly dependent on the US. And, whether it be developing conventional military capabilities, deploying them in combat, or deciding what role European nuclear weapons can play in deterring Russian aggression, they cannot confront these challenges individually.
Nor can they do so effectively without the UK. In an era of multiplying threats and strained resources, Britain’s military capabilities, readiness to deploy force and nuclear deterrent make it an indispensable partner.
It seems unlikely, however, that the current UK government will engage in substantive discussions on closer security co-operation with Europe, which is politically toxic to some Conservatives. What of a prospective Labour government? Keir Starmer and his team have indicated that the EU will be a foreign policy priority and that they would negotiate a defence and security “pact”. The party has also signalled a desire to strengthen ties with Germany and France — through a security treaty with the former and a “reboot” of the 2010 Lancaster House Treaty with the latter.
But good intentions are not enough — difficult choices lie ahead. Domestically, it appears defence funding is set to decline following Jeremy Hunt’s Budget last week. Labour will need to plot its own spending in the knowledge that the more serious its commitment to defence, the greater weight it will carry in negotiations with partners.
When it comes to those partners, Starmer must decide what he wants — and what he might be willing to give in return. This means engaging now with France and Germany, building relationships and developing trust. Nor is bilateralism alone enough: France and Germany no longer run the European show, and the EU has ramped up its own ambitions, particularly in defence industry co-operation.
Labour must begin explaining its ambitions to EU officials, rolling the pitch for any future negotiation. But the onus is not simply on the UK. The EU, too, must become more flexible. Its “you broke it” approach to post-Brexit relations — insisting any initiative would have to come from the UK — is hardly appropriate given the gravity of the threats we all face. Brussels must also resolve the tension that underpins its approach. On the one hand, the UK is seen as a uniquely important security partner. On the other, it is treated as a third country like any other.
It is unimaginable that Europe could develop a defence industrial base capable of underpinning enhanced military capabilities without UK participation. Yet, in the name of “strategic autonomy” or “European sovereignty”, the European Defence Fund — created to promote joint development of military capabilities — is in effect foreclosed to states outside the single market. How this chimes with declarations of unwavering support for Ukraine, or declamatory statements about the need for Europe to take more responsibility for its own security, is anyone’s guess.
Brexit introduced a dynamic of competition into UK-EU relations. The failures of one side could be portrayed as victories for the other. Such zero-sum thinking has no place in security policy, particularly when the stakes are as high as they are today. European security depends on a mature approach to developing closer collaboration with the UK.