With Israeli normalisation talks stalled, what is Saudi Arabia’s next move? 

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The writer is author of ‘Black Wave’ and distinguished fellow at Columbia University’s Institute of Global Politics

On the afternoon of October 7, as the extent of the carnage in southern Israel was becoming clear, Hamas’s political leader Ismail Haniyeh warned Arab countries that Israel couldn’t protect them. 

Haniyeh’s words highlighted the weakness of the Israeli army and state in that moment but — coming amid the talk of normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia — it also worked as a veiled threat to Arab countries: you could be next. This must have cast a chill over Riyadh. Iran not only has a nuclear programme, drones that its clients in Yemen, the Houthis, have used against Saudi Arabia and, in Hizbollah, a powerful paramilitary that is active in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq — but now another of its allies is showing vastly improved military capabilities. 

Which is why it was so notable that five days later, Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi initiated a phone call to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman — their first conversation since the detente between the two countries in March and the first at this level since ties ruptured in 2016. On Wednesday, the Iranian foreign minister also held a meeting with his Saudi counterpart in Jeddah on the sidelines of an urgent meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation. 

Clearly, Saudi-Iran rapprochement is not dead. In fact, the Saudis are probably relieved they have a channel to Tehran. Riyadh was clear-eyed earlier this year about Iranian promises yet felt they had no choice but to defuse rising tensions. The same applies now: with Haniyeh’s threat hanging in the air, it is best to keep the Iranians close.

For the Iranians, the rapprochement was meant to buy breathing space as pressure, regional and domestic, was piling on. Now it provides a release valve. Iran and Hizbollah appear to have been taken aback by the scope of the Hamas operation and what it unleashed, including two US carrier strike groups in the Mediterranean. Western diplomats and Arab officials have indicated that, despite the public bombast, Iranian officials are privately seeking a way out of the escalation. What that requires or might look like is still unclear.  

Much hinges on how Israel’s military campaign against Gaza unfolds. Arab officials were annoyed with Washington even before Jordan cancelled a summit with President Joe Biden, including over America’s refusal to call for a ceasefire. In the immediate aftermath of the Hamas attack, private appeals for the US to restrain Israel’s retaliation were dismissed.

Last month, normalisation talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia had been progressing. “Every day we get closer,” the Saudi crown prince said in September. But the Saudis expressed frustration that Israel was unwilling to give more to the Palestinians in exchange for ties with the kingdom. A senior Saudi official denied the talks had been suspended even though there’s been no contact since October 7 — the priority now, he told me, was dealing with the crisis.

Headlines about trade corridors and normalisation between the two dominated most of the year, though it felt like a race to outpace the tensions bubbling across the occupied West Bank, Tel Aviv and Tehran. Now the so-called axis of resistance led by Iran, posing as the “real” defender of the Palestinians, has reclaimed the narrative. 

If, or when, normalisation talks between Israel and Saudi resume, with either Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu or his successor, the Palestinian component of the equation will have to be considerable. So far, the Saudis may have been content with the minimum possible for the Palestinians as part of a greater deal more focused on the kingdom’s needs. After this cycle of violence, however, that will no longer suffice.

The Saudis will have to extract substantial concessions from the Israelis, not so much out of support for the Palestinians but out of self-interest. Saudi Arabia, but also others, such as the UAE, Egypt and Jordan, will want to show that they can deliver a political horizon for the Palestinians and help end the occupation. This is in contrast to Iran’s approach, relying on groups such as Hamas whose actions attract Israel’s retaliatory wrath.

It’s a tall order. The war on Gaza will probably be long, the death toll will only grow. Netanyahu is in no mood to compromise and will hang on to power for as long as he can. The Palestinian Authority is at its weakest. Biden may not have the desire, credibility or bandwidth to do much beyond containing the conflict. But wrestling the Palestinian card away from Tehran is in everyone’s interest — not least, the Palestinians.