Not one of Boris Johnson’s key team agreed on what Brexit was for. This is just the most glaring failure of an administration that may become the seminal case study on why governments fail.
The scale of dysfunction is laid bare in Johnson at 10, a history which might alternatively be titled “How not to be Prime Minister”. Anthony Seldon and Raymond Newell recount that Lord Frost, the Brexit negotiator, wanted a “free-market . . . Singapore on Thames”. For Munira Mirza, head of the policy unit, it was about helping left-behind regions with higher spending. Dominic Cummings, the chief strategist, wanted to invest in innovation and “reinvent the state”, while Michael Gove wished to maximise sovereignty “without stripping away safeguards”. For Johnson, it was a “portmanteau chance” for change. Five different views in the core team on the central issue of the day.
The lion’s share of blame lies with the weak and chaotic Johnson. But this is not mere history now that more sober men run the main UK parties. There are broader lessons, beyond “don’t pick unsuitable leaders”, that will be relevant long after he is no more than a horror story to frighten young Conservatives.
First, there needs to be an agreed mission which unites the core team. This was only true for Johnson in the five months in 2019 when the sole goals were saving Brexit and winning re-election. Had that focus continued, Johnson’s lazy subcontracting of power to the Vote Leave staff might have mattered less.
It is no accident that the most successful governments often come from opposition where they have had time to hone their mission and build a talented, unified team. Rishi Sunak has such a group but the immediate problems he faces leave little space for any strategy beyond saving the election. Labour still lacks clarity of mission, nor can one talk of Starmerites as one could of Thatcherites, Blairites and Cameroons.
Second, rage is no substitute for strategy. Too many Tories are driven by a fury which grew with the obstruction they experienced after the Brexit vote. Johnson alone wanted to be a unifier, but the Brexit wounds were still too raw and, in any case, he was a consistent commuter on the line of least resistance.
Tories still default to denunciations of “Remoaners” and attacks on “the blob” (a UK version of the US swamp). All parties have dragons to slay but unharnessed rage and paranoia are counterproductive, fostering extreme positions and ultimately impeding reform.
An obvious instance is the civil service. Downing Street rightly desires a more modern, nimble, data-oriented and project-focused machine. But in place of a methodical reform plan, there were leaked hitlists of senior officials and talk of a war on Whitehall. It was fundamentally unserious. So the patient grind of serious change gave way to one set of officials being replaced by others of similar ilk while the wider service was simply cowed. Sunak was not part of this, but the underlying rage against Whitehall still animates his party.
Universities should have been key institutions in both levelling-up and research. Johnson wanted them to flourish. Yet policy “was dictated by elements within No 10 who chose to tar all universities with the actions of a radical and ‘woke’ minority”.
Nor can a peacetime government be run as if in a permanent state of war because it allows you to circumvent process. Once you get a taste for breaking rules, it’s a hard habit to kick.
And rage is not a uniquely Tory trait. A Labour party whose deputy leader refers to opponents as “scum” and too many of whose members regard Tory voters as somehow morally deficient can also fall victim.
Where rage was not the animating emotion, good things were achieved. Progress on the skills agenda was down to the alignment of unity of purpose and an expert adviser with a well-considered strategy.
Also self-defeating is a tech-bro instinct to move fast and break things without regard to the consequences. A feature of Brexit, this trait remains worryingly true for many Tories on Europe. “Completing Brexit” is the sole goal. The growing clamour to leave the European Convention on Human Rights pays no heed to the probability that departure would collapse co-operation with the EU on security and justice issues or to the impact on Northern Ireland.
The same applies to the ill-defined bill to review and scrap 4,000 EU laws by year-end. Which laws, you ask? They’ll get back to you. Sunak, and his potential successor Kemi Badenoch, the business secretary, are now scaling back the plan, having belatedly grasped the risks of a pledge he made when standing for leader.
The final and most predictable cause of failure is a weak cabinet and an insistence on bypassing parliament. Effective governments require effective ministers (a point Keir Starmer must also heed). But Johnson wanted no rivals in his top team while Cummings, whose methods were Leninist rather than democratic, saw ministers as people to be worked round. The contempt for MPs — however merited at times — was ultimately self-destructive. They are a premier’s infantry. Strong leaders seek to carry, not just coerce, their people.
Mercifully, neither Sunak nor Starmer share Johnson’s flaws. But neither has yet steered their parties entirely away from the wider points of failure. At least they have a defining cautionary tale. It’s a shame we cannot be grateful.