The writer is head of the foreign and defence policy team at the American Enterprise Institute
It’s really bad. So bad the Pentagon is not only conducting its own investigation, it also immediately called in the Justice Department to investigate. Over 100 pages of highly classified CIA Operations Center and Joint Chiefs of Staff assessments — some intended only for the five eyes intelligence partners, others not releasable to allies at all — have been exposed. Some are derived from human intelligence, so could put assets at risk; many will reveal to US intelligence targets that their communications are compromised.
The files sat on a public server for months before the government realised they were there, and it doesn’t appear to know whether what’s already been released is the extent of the damage. But investigations by Aric Toler of Bellingcat and other media organisations quickly revealed the source of the leak: Jack Teixeira, a 21-year-old Air National Guardsman, who is now in federal custody.
The US was lucky in that some of the information has been altered, which allows room to disparage the content and deny its accuracy (As South Korea and the UK have done). And its response — to inform allies, apologise, mitigate where possible, and hunt down the traitor — has been swift.
However, America’s allies are quietly exasperated, as well they should be. The revelations will pose significant political problems for the government of South Korea (which has been caught out via intercepts prevaricating over whether to send weapons to Ukraine), further Egypt’s difficulties with Congressional approval of military aid (after exposing its secret plans to supply Russia with rockets), and do real damage to Kyiv’s war effort. It will unquestionably impose significant costs on US intelligence as targets take action to shield themselves. It could also prompt allies like Ukraine to restrict access to their operations — as they have with casualty figures. This would make it far harder for Nato partners to assess the course of the war and impact of western assistance.
The dilemma for all these countries is that America’s intelligence capabilities are incredibly valuable. And the US, in turn, depends on intelligence from allies to validate, correct, and legitimise its assessments. The greatest damage this leak could do would be to reduce such sharing. If in order to prevent compromise, the US restricts access further, it will lose visibility and allies will lose the ability to synchronise their actions: in other words, constricting intelligence-sharing decreases burden-sharing.
There is some good news. While specific details will be incredibly valuable to Russia and other adversaries, these are not bombshell revelations: journalists had already reported Ukrainian ammunition running low; peace talks between Moscow and Kyiv were never likely; allies have long been aware that the US eavesdrops on them; and the disparaging assessment of Ukraine’s forthcoming offensive may prove no more accurate than previous predictions were.
So far, this leak also does not appear to be as damaging as historical exposures have been. Take Aldrich Ames, the CIA case officer and Soviet agent arrested in 1994, whose treason resulted in the execution of numerous CIA and FBI sources. Army intelligence analyst Chelsea Manning leaked 750,000 military and intelligence documents in 2010. Three years later, Department of Defence contractor Edward Snowden released more than a million pages of intelligence on military capabilities, sources and methods of collection. Both the Manning and Snowden leaks also put lives at risk.
In all but the Ames case, the leakers were low-level operatives. That suggests inadequate vetting and supervision at the more junior end; the problem is that restrictions on domestic surveillance are likely to complicate supervision of social media and extracurricular activity that might reveal dangerous proclivities. Technology making data ever more portable, distribution more global and communications more bespoke will make it easier to amass information and distribute it — either privately or publicly.
Given the damage wreaked on the Ukrainian war effort, Kyiv has played this well. The documents contained detailed assessments of their ammunition and air defence holdings, including the specific dates at which their stocks will be completely depleted, disposition and equipping of specific units, timelines for receiving training and equipment from allies. In keeping with its overall excellence in information warfare, Ukraine’s leadership was mostly silent, leaving the military to respond that battlefield information is both perishable and outdated. They will probably have already taken action to reduce the usefulness of what Russia now knows.
The Pentagon can only hope that the tactical and operational intelligence isn’t useful enough to allow Moscow to torpedo Ukraine’s battle plans. Given America’s part in creating this vulnerability, it should be sending Kyiv replenishment weapons and helping them re-plan their offensive to drive out Russian forces. Its intelligence lapse increased the risk to Ukraine — increasing its assistance is the least it should do.